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ABSTRACT 
This research evaluates a cyber test-bed, DEXTAR (Defense Exercises for Team 
Awareness Research), and examines the relationship between good and bad team 
performance in increasingly difficult scenarios. Twenty-one computer science graduate 
students (seven three-person teams), with experience in cybersecurity, participated in a 
team-based cyber defense exercise in the context of DEXTAR, a high fidelity 
cybersecurity testbed. Performance measures were analyzed in addition to team process, 
team behavior, and workload to examine the relationship between good and bad teams. 
Lessons learned are reported that will inform the next generation of DEXTAR. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cybersecurity relies on human analysts to recognize and resolve threats based on 
their knowledge of network vulnerabilities and overall healthy network performance 
(Champion, Rajivan, Cooke, & Jariwala, 2012). The field of team cognition strives to 
understand how humans work together to make better decisions in team-based 
environments, particularly through communication (Cooke, Gorman, Myers, & Duran, 
2013). Recently, team cognition research has been conducted to understand effective 
processes and behaviors in cyber defense teams. 
 The success of a cyber-attack is determined by an ability to exploit some 
component of a cyber system, and the amount and complexity of these attacks grows 
every year. Such growth has triggered cybersecurity researchers to examine cyber 
vulnerabilities including sophisticated hacking techniques (Im & Baskerville, 2005) and 
human-user actions (Crawford, 2008). Much of this research focuses on how good the 
attacker is at deploying a hack or taking advantage of the human-users of the system 
being attacked. From a human systems engineering perspective, human analysts are a 
major component of the cyber system tasked with identifying and mitigating thousands of 
potential attacks every hour. This task contains processes of threat detection and 
escalation, through interactions between humans and technology, complicated by noisy 
network traffic data. This has led to questions about how effective humans are at 
performing such a task while experiencing cognitive fatigue as a result of task-work 
complexities (Champion, Jariwala, Ward, & Cooke, 2014; Champion et al., 2012; Knott 
et al., 2013). Research has shown that, compared to individual cyber analysts, 
cybersecurity teams are better equipped to complete complex tasks that may result in 
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cyber-analyst cognitive fatigue (Rajivan, 2014). Organizations have demanded additional 
personnel in an attempt to prevent loss from cyber-threats, however more personnel does 
not directly translate to teamwork. 
In cybersecurity, humans work with network tools and hardware components on 
different parts of the task. This socio-technical system requires that humans and 
technology work together to detect clues about an attack that are spread across the 
network, occur at different points in time, and displayed to different analysts. This is 
unquestionably a human systems issue (Gutzwiller, Fugate, Sawyer, & Hancock, 2015). 
DEXTAR (Defense Exercises for Team Awareness Research), a human-in-the-loop 
cybersecurity testbed, was launched to further such research.  DEXTAR's capabilities 
were extended through the computing facility DETER, a virtual network cybersecurity 
testbed. With both testbeds working together, human-in-the-loop studies on cybersecurity 
can be conducted in realistic large scale environments to conduct research on team 
behavior, hardware performance, and software effectiveness, to name a few. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Defining Teams 
 Before discussing teamwork, it is important to define teams. As previously 
discussed, cybersecurity analysts are tasked with identifying threats to security that are 
spread across a network. This requires interactions with people and technology to 
collaborate and substantiate analysis. Teams do exhibit this behavior, but this alone does 
not define “team,” as teams are more than a group of individuals working together (Paris, 
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Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000). Specifically, teams are made up of members with 
explicit roles and responsibilities who work interdependently, adaptively, and 
dynamically towards a shared goal (Salas, Dickinson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992). 
In cybersecurity, this ideally means different analysts with unique responsibilities all 
coordinating with each other to construct expertise on an identified problem, corroborate 
security issues, and prevent loss. However, research has found that cybersecurity 
personnel tend not to work in teams. 
 
Teamwork in Cybersecurity 
In the professional cyber-defense domain the human’s role tends to be that of 
Information Security Analysts (Champion et al, 2014). Analysts must recognize that an 
attack is actually taking place in a low signal to noise environment, though the methods 
attackers use rapidly change, requiring expertise beyond that of a novice (Liu, Erbacher, 
Glodek, Etoty, & Yen, 2013). A common structure includes levels of personnel 
responsible for triage (identifying real for false alerts) who report to responders (ongoing 
threat identification and report correlation) who further escalate to forensics (large-scale 
emerging threat identification) (D’Amico, Whitley, Tesone, OBrien, & Roth, 2005). Such 
a structure encourages individual work and results in cybersecurity analysts feeling 
daunted by poor team organization and experiencing communication breakdowns, while 
analyzing a wide range of possible security alerts including attrition, web, email, 
removable media, lost or stolen equipment, and others – over 10,000 per hour in some 
professional settings. Traditionally, analysts in cybersecurity work independently and 
these analysts report feelings of cognitive fatigue (Champion et al., 2012). Cognitive 
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fatigue has been shown to be related to reduced human perception and comprehension 
(Cain & Schuster, 2014) and reduced communication (Champion et al., 2012). When 
perception, comprehension, and communication are hindered, performance can be 
negatively affected. Teamwork, however, has been shown to relieve these effects 
(Rajivan, 2014), thus additional teamwork research in cybersecurity should be a priority. 
 
Team Cognition 
  A better understanding of cyber-analyst team’s cognitive processes may lead to 
better cyber-analyst team performance. Cyber-analyst work is mainly represented by 
cognitive tasks. If research seeks to better understand cyber-analyst teams then it must 
examine cognitive processes at the team level (Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008), and to 
understand such processes requires observations about how teams learn, reason, problem 
solve, decide, and make judgments (Cooke et al., 2013). In cybersecurity, team cognition 
sheds light on such processes and allows researchers to measure those that result in teams 
making better assessments of cybersecurity events. In turn, this informs the design of 
training, tools, and team structures that improve team cognition in the cybersecurity 
context. As research has shown, team cognition and performance are often positively 
related (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001; Cooke, Gorman, & Winner, 2007). There are 
various theories of what team cognition is, and the two most prominent theories discussed 
in the literature are covered in the next sections. 
 
Shared Mental Models 
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 Traditionally, team cognition has been measured using a Shared Mental Model 
(SMM) approach (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). By combining the individual 
knowledge structures from all team members, analysis can reveal how much information 
about a team task is shared. The theory supposes that when team members are on the 
same page – have the same mental model – their coordination is stronger, especially 
revealed in expert teams (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001; Converse, 1993). However, 
evaluations of the shared mental model theory state that it is an oversimplification of 
team cognition as it is unlikely that individual team members, with specific roles and 
unique knowledge, have the same mental models (Cooke et al., 2007). This criticism 
showed how shared mental models fit in group work contexts (where all members are 
homogeneous, sharing the same roles and tasks) and proposed a new theory of team 
cognition called Interactive Team Cognition. 
 
Interactive Team Cognition 
 Interactive Team Cognition (ITC) is a theory that views team cognition as a team-
based activity, rather than a product of individual knowledge. (Cooke et al., 2013). 
Because teams are heterogeneous (its members have different roles and responsibilities) 
mental models of individual knowledge should differ. Thus, team cognition must be 
measured at the team level by observing team behaviors within a simulated or real-world 
context. Context is important from an ecological perspective, of which ITC theory 
adopts, as the environment should closely resemble real-world settings, including limited 
experimental interruptions (Cooke, Gorman, & Kiekel, 2008). ITC theory allows for 
observations of team behavior that are unobtrusive and retain context purity. Many 
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experiments have been conducted based on the ITC perspective such as uninhabited 
aerial vehicles (Demir, McNeese, & Cooke, 2016), urban search and rescue (Bartlett & 
Cooke, 2015), non-combat military (Fouse et al., 2011), and cybersecurity (Rajivan, 
Janssen, & Cooke, 2013) simulations to examine team skill acquisition, human-agent 
teaming, and performance via team communication. These experiments show how 
equipped this perspective is for conceptualizing team experimentation in contextually 
different domains. 
 
Developing DEXTAR 
 The cybersecurity literature is becoming more accessible as researchers 
publish their findings. Many are pointing to a need for cyber-analyst studies with skilled 
participants in more complex and realistic settings (Champion et al., 2012; Rajivan et al., 
2013). The development of DEXTAR was an iterative process, informed by the literature 
and two studies of particular interest are discussed in detail.  
To better understand the conditions experienced by cybersecurity analysts, 
researchers conducted a cognitive task analysis (CTA) on cyber-analysts and then 
simulated their findings in a synthetic task environment (Champion et al., 2012). The 
CTA revealed that real-world cybersecurity teams can often be described as groups of 
independently working individuals, and identified team structure, team communication, 
and information overload as possible contributing factors for low team performance. In 
the lab, researchers expanded on the synthetic task environment CyberCog to replicate 
these conditions. Teams of 3 participants classified 30 security alerts as either 
Reconnaissance, False Positive, Failed Attack, or Attack in a 30 minute session. In a 
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second high-workload session, the same team would classify 144 security alerts in 60 
minutes. Their research found that in the second session there was a 16% drop in accurate 
security event detection and reduced situation awareness, markedly due to further false 
alarms, a lack of communication, and incorrect security event classification. Their 
research showed a strong effect of workload on team performance and the problems 
associated with overloading a team’s cognitive capacity. However, the design of the task 
was made simple enough so that participants were not required to have any previous 
knowledge of cybersecurity. 
Further research, conducted using the synthetic task environment CyberCog, 
simulated cyber-analyst tasks with high workload to replicate conditions experienced by 
cybersecurity analysts (Rajivan et al., 2013). Network intrusion alerts that varied in 
complexity were displayed to participants who then classified each alert as either 
suspicious or benign. Participants were assigned to a “group” condition where all 
members had the same role, or a “team” condition where all members had specific roles. 
Both conditions had access to the same tools to aid participants in the alert-classification 
task. The groups and teams then classified 225 alerts in two 30 minute sessions. When 
classifying easy alerts, groups and teams both performed equally. However, when 
classifying difficult alerts, teams significantly outperformed groups. This research 
highlighted the benefits of teamwork when tasks are complex and workload is high, and 
called for higher-fidelity environments that led to the development of the DEXTAR 
testbed. Similar to Champion and colleagues’ experiment, Rajivan et al. made their 
experiment simple enough so that participants were not required to have any prior 
knowledge about cybersecurity. 
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OVERVIEW 
The cybersecurity domain is a complex system of human-computer interactions, 
including defensive and offensive operations, set in a wide array of contexts (Knott et al., 
2013). This complex system must be realized in the lab in order validate the research and 
inform real-world cybersecurity practices. To simulate and conduct experiments in such 
an environment, human systems research needs theoretical approaches that are 
unobtrusive, and testbeds that are capable of mirroring real-world conditions. A 
controlled high-fidelity environment that matches the cognitive demands of information 
security analysis may be the best way to study cyber-analyst teams. This ultimately 
requires recruiting skilled participants with backgrounds in computer science and related 
professional fields. 
Through an iterative development process informed by research, the DEXTAR 
testbed was designed to conduct human-in-the-loop cybersecurity experimentation; 
physically host and analyze six-member teams; collect user interaction and team 
performance data; capture audio, video, and computer screen recordings; and test 
hardware configurations and software. Through integration with DETER Lab, the 
DEXTAR testbed is also capable of large-scale virtual networks that are fully 
customizable; virtual machines and servers with Windows and Linux operating systems; 
physical testbed integration through virtual networks; human, scripted, and agent based 
cyberattacks; and temporal traffic and network performance data (Benzel, 2011). 
Using the high-fidelity DEXTAR testbed, this research examines how high 
scoring cybersecurity teams differ from low scoring teams in terms of performance and 
process. Additionally, this research will evaluate the viability of the DEXTAR testbed in 
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its first experiment. The experiment manipulates difficulty to increase the team’s 
cognitive demand over four scenarios to elicit responses from participants regarding their 
perceived workload. In turn, this research assesses the DEXTAR testbed as a high-
fidelity cybersecurity experimentation platform, and will make suggestions for future 
experimental designs. The following hypotheses were made: 
H1: High-performance teams will exhibit significantly better team processes than 
low-performance teams as observed by an experimenter. 
H2: Perceived workload will increase significantly from mission 1 through 
mission 3 as measured by the NASA TLX. 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Twenty-one students from Arizona State University’s Computer Science graduate 
program and the surrounding community were recruited to participate in this study. 
Participants were required to have advanced knowledge about cybersecurity, and 
recruiting materials (Appendix A) specifically asked for experience or education in 
information technology/network administration, cybersecurity, or hacking. All 
participants were over 18-years old and had to be able to work at a computer for three 
hours. Due to the training materials being presented in English, and measures requiring 
experimenters to document verbal communication within the team, participants needed to 
be able to understand the spoken and written English language. 
Materials and Design 
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Environment 
Seven teams of three participants were exposed to a virtual network hosted by 
DETER Labs at the University of Southern California. The virtual network was a mock 
business network for a fake company named GEO. The network included 3 data servers, 
1 webserver, 30 personal computers, and 3 IT computers with administrative rights to the 
network. Participants acted as the company’s network administrators, each with full and 
equal access to make changes as needed to protect the network and its data. To access 
this network from the CERTT Lab at Arizona State University, participants were seated 
at one of three computers in the DEXTAR testbed (Figure 1) with remote desktop 
connections. 
 
 
Figure 1. The DEXTAR Testbed. Participants sat at one of three stations (4, 5, or 6 from 
front to back) on the left. 
 
 
 
11 
 
Each participant station (labeled 4, 5, and 6) was responsible for specific regions 
of the virtual network. Station 4 was responsible for the webserver and compiling the 
team report. Station 5 was responsible for administration workstations and the admin data 
server. Station 6 was responsible for sales workstations and the sales data server. Each 
computer had two monitors. The left monitor contained the virtual IT machine’s desktop, 
and the right contained email software and electronic measures built in the DEXTAR 
testbed (Figure 2). 
 
  
Figure 2. The left and right monitor screens. The left screen displays the virtual 
machine’s desktop, and the right displays electronic measures built in to the DEXTAR 
testbed. 
 
 The virtual network simulated a series of attacks separated into three increasingly 
difficult scenarios and a fourth scenario that was a repeat of the first. Participants would 
recognize the threat and then offer a resolution in their report. All attacks were scripted to 
maintain experimental control and executed by the experimenter at the start of each 
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scenario. To increase difficulty, the scenarios began with a basic denial of service attack 
on the mock company’s webserver. The second scenario consisted of an SQL injection in 
which malicious code was injected into a database on the webserver to gather customer 
financial information and return it to the agent-attacker. The third scenario emulated 
social engineering to gain access to a computer on the virtual network in the 
administration department and, from inside the virtual business network, send proprietary 
information to a virtual-attacker machine. Additionally, the third scenario included a 
situational awareness email sent to participants from an employee in administration 
informing them of a suspected security breach on the affected computer. The fourth and 
final scenario repeated the first denial of service attack. 
 
 
Figure 3. Reporting software. The banner displays mission time and mission number to 
the participant. The left side displays a canned email describing a suspicious activity on a 
computer. The right side is where the team fills out and submits their report. 
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All scenarios included other benign emails to the participants, and emails were 
accessible from reporting software by all participants (Figure 3). Each scenario ended 
when a detailed report was submitted from station 4 using the reporting software, or after 
30 minutes had elapsed. The participant-submitted report included what type of threat 
was discovered and how it was stopped, and was considered as the team’s objective 
scenario-completion time. To help participants keep track of time, a thirty-minute 
countdown timer was displayed on a projector screen. 
Prior to any experimentation, a brief training session led by an experimenter 
introduced the participants to the environment (Appendix B), walked them through all 
provided tools, exposed them to their reporting software, and provided them with a 
topology of the virtual network (Appendix C). 
 
Tools 
Common tools were provided to the participants to aid in their work. Wireshark, a 
network protocol analyzer, showed participants what was happening on the network and 
helped participants monitor communication to network computers from outside attackers 
(Figure 4). The network security auditing tool nMap helped participants determine what 
services were operating on networked machines and what firewalls were active on them. 
Participants also had access to the command prompt on all virtual Windows XP 
machines, and the terminal on all virtual Linux machines. The command prompt and 
terminal are the operating system’s command-line interpreter for Windows and Linux. 
Both allowed participants to execute features and tools built in to the operating system 
(Figure 5). 
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Figure 4. Wireshark. This image shows a denial of service attack in progress that is being 
displayed by Wireshark. 
 
 
Figure 5. The terminal. Command-line interpreters execute tools built in to the operating 
system. Cygwin is used to gain access to a Linux based operating system from Windows. 
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Measures 
After each scenario, participants completed the NASA-TLX (Hart & Staveland, 
1988) to measure their perceived difficulty of the task across four dimensions: Activity, 
Time Pressure, Success, and Emotion (Appendix D). Activity measures the amount of 
mental and perceptual activity required while performing the task. Time Pressure 
measures the pace at which participants perceived the task. Success is a measure of how 
successful participants thought they were at accomplishing their goals. Finally, Emotion 
measures the participant’s enjoyment of the task. At the end of the experiment, 
participants completed the mini-marker personality test (Saucier, 1994) to measure their 
intro/extraversion (Appendix E), and a demographics survey (Appendix F). All measures 
were completed on the computer monitor to their right. 
 During each scenario, an experimenter took notes on the team’s process using a 
process rating tool (Appendix G) that rated seven observable processes (coordination, 
communication, situation awareness, problem solving, decision making, plan revision, 
and overall process) from poor to excellent; and three observable behaviors (taking turns 
speaking, off topic conversations, and plan discussion) from never to always; and two 
additional questions regarding whether or not all team members agree on their report and 
whether or not team members used provided tools. Audio and video were captured as 
participants worked through the scenarios for verification of the process ratings. The 
participant’s computer screens were captured for the duration of the experiment using the 
screen capturing software SnagIt, and a microphone mounted at each participant 
workstation captured verbal communication. 
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Procedure 
 Three participants located the experiment in the CERTT Lab on ASU’s 
Polytechnic campus, were greeted, and were provided informed consent (Appendix H) 
that needed to be signed by all participants before experimentation could begin. 
Participation was reimbursed at $10 per hour, and was still paid should someone decide 
to drop from the experiment. Snacks and water were provided. An experimental session 
took approximately four hours. 
 Participants were first randomly seated at one of three workstations that were 
already remotely connected to the virtual network hosted at DETER Lab. The assigned 
station would determine the participant’s network responsibilities (webserver and report 
scribe, admin machines, or sales machines). Due to a simultaneous experiment being 
conducted, participants were fitted with physiological monitoring devices which were 
then calibrated, and participants completed the N-Back task to capture inter-individual 
working memory (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Perrig, & Meier, 2010) as it related to physiology 
(data from these physiological measures are not addressed in this experiment). 
Experimenter-led training introduced participants to the environment, walked them 
through all tools, exposed them to the reporting software, and provided them with a 
network topology handout. After ensuring all participants understood their resources and 
environment the experiment began. 
 The experimenter started the attack script for the first scenario. Participants had 
30 minutes to recognize the attack, resolve it, and submit a report. The scenario ended 
when the report was submitted by the scribe at station 4 (ideally after obtaining the 
team’s agreement) or after 30 minutes had elapsed, whichever came first. A thirty-minute 
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countdown was displayed on a projector screen to help participants keep track of time. At 
the end of the scenario, the experimenter ensured all participant tools were closed, that 
their left screen was on the virtual machine desktop, and that their right screen showed 
the Workload TLX survey which subjects then completed. This process was repeated for 
all remaining scenarios. 
 Once all scenarios were finished, participants completed a personality test and 
demographics survey. Afterwards, their physiological monitoring devices were removed. 
Finally, participants were debriefed, paid (for which they signed an acknowledgement 
(Appendix I) and received a receipt), and thanked for their time. 
 
RESULTS 
Missing Data 
Missing data were discovered in both the mini-markers survey and demographics 
electronic questionnaire due to software issues that resulted in data being captured from 
only one team. These data were not analyzed. 
 
Team Performance 
Team scores were calculated per scenario by giving one point for discovering a 
threat and one point for resolving a threat. The total threat discovered and resolved points 
were weighted by dividing by the amount of time (in seconds) it took the team to 
complete the scenario, and then increased to an integer by multiplying by 10,000. Time 
was acquired from the scenario start time until the team submitted their final report. The 
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weighted scores from all four scenarios were added together to obtain a total score for 
each team. Five bonus points were given for recognizing the situation awareness event in 
mission three. Five points was chosen because it matched the weight of recognizing one 
threat in 30 minutes, after accounting for time and multiplying to an integer. 
Team performance data proved to be nonparametric. To separate the high- and 
low-performing teams, all scores above the median (21.91) were considered high. Four 
low teams (Team 2, 4, 5, and 6) scored 20.52, 21.91, 21.60, and 21.56. Three high teams 
(Team 1, 3, and 7) scored 29.85, 22.44, and 74.99. As expected due to the median split, a 
Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed that high-scoring teams significantly outperformed low-
scoring teams, X2(1, N = 7)=4.5, p = 0.03, with a mean rank of 2.5 for bad-team and 6 for 
good-team. It should be noted that no teams successfully recognized the social 
engineering attack in mission three and only Team 1 recognized the SQL-injection in 
mission two. 
Table 1 
 
Team Performance including Situation Awareness (SA) Points 
 
Team 
Threats 
Recognized 
Threats 
Resolved 
Bonus SA 
Points 
Time (in 
seconds) 
1 3 0 5 5,821.53 
2 2 0 5 5,978.12 
3 2 2 0 7,181.39 
4 2 1 5 7,089.77 
5 2 1 5 7,325.75 
6 2 2 0 7,481.99 
7 2 2 0 4,961.00 
Note. The values presented aggregate all four missions. Scores (not presented in this 
table) were calculated per mission relative to mission time. 
 
The results from Team 7 were particularly interesting and pointed to the ability 
for a team to inflate their score through time alone. Table 1 highlights the relatively 
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similar performance, in terms of threats recognized and resolved, exhibited by all teams, 
as well as the score boost attributed by time. Additional analyses were not performed on 
these data. Table 2 displays the data from mission four, the mission that resulted in Team 
7’s disparate score. During debriefing, the team attributed their desire to be done with the 
experiment as a reason for the short mission time. 
Table 2 
 
Team Performance Results from Mission 4 
 
Team 
Threats 
Recognized 
Threats 
Resolved 
Time (in 
seconds) 
 
Score 
1 1 0 741.92 13.48 
2 1 0 1,003.18 9.97 
3 1 1 1,807.21 11.07 
4 1 1 1,774.38 11.27 
5 1 1 1,783.73 11.21 
6 1 1 1,900.00 10.53 
7 1 1 312.00 64.10 
Note. Scores are calculated by dividing Threats Recognized and Threats Resolved by 
Time and multiplying both values by 10,000 to increase them to an integer. The 
combined integers represent the mission score. 
 
Team Process and Team Behavior 
This study was underpowered and significant findings related to performance 
were unlikely. These data were also nonparametric which limited the exploration of 
descriptive statistics. One behavior that stood out, however, was that all teams opted 
against using nMap. Additional analyses were not performed on these data. 
 
Workload 
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Descriptive statistics were examined on all dimensions of the survey and across 
all four missions. On some workload dimensions, such as Mental Activity and Emotion, 
patterns between high and low performance opposed each other, while Time Pressure and 
Goal Achievement patterns were more in agreement. While examining perceived 
workload, a measure that has close ties to performance (Champion et al., 2012; Rajivan et 
al., 2013), the variance over the first three missions for good teams was less for the 
Mental Activity and Time Pressure dimensions than it was for bad teams who exhibited a 
large decline. It is important to explain that missions 2 and 3 were affected by network 
packet loss (normal network behavior) and threats failed to display for participants within 
the thirty minute mission time. From an experimenter’s point-of-view this is a missed 
opportunity to collect meaningful data. However, from the participant’s point-of-view 
this may have generated a very different perspective: either there is something there that 
is difficult to find, or there is nothing threatening happening. Future experiments may 
want to incorporate no-signal missions to attempt to reproduce and explain this behavior. 
Another interesting description came from the Emotion dimension. Overall, good teams 
reported more negative emotions as missions progressed, whereas bad teams reported 
feeling better as missions progressed. It is apparent that additional experimentation is 
required to attempt to replicate and understand these findings with significant differences 
between teams. It may then be beneficial to mix low- and high-signal with expert and 
novice conditions. 
 
DISCUSSION 
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The DEXTAR testbed is capable of high-fidelity cybersecurity experimentation. 
The synthetic environment itself performed just as a real network does, demonstrated by 
network traffic data, packet loss, and analyst’s tools that functioned as they would on real 
networks. 
The expected finding between good and bad team performance scores comes with 
caveats due to the small sample size, the performance score median split, and missions 2 
and 3 being affected by packet loss (discussed in detail in the following section). The lack 
of clear differences may suggest a need for more sensitive scoring or to increase the 
difficulty of the task. However, the exploration of descriptive statistics may have 
provided some insights for future designs. 
Questions also remain about what truly makes an expert cyber-analyst. Cognitive 
task analyses (Champion et al., 2012) helped to start this conversation, however more 
work needs to be done in order to develop measures that test participant skill level. 
Keyword pairwise comparisons, developed by understanding expert analyst’s mental 
models of the cybersecurity domain, may be a plausible solution. 
 
Evaluation of DEXTAR: Lessons Learned 
Lessons learned from this experiment regarding the efficacy of DEXTAR as a 
high-fidelity cybersecurity testbed are discussed in this section. The information is also 
presented in Table 3 at the end of this section for quick reference. 
Mission two included an SQL injection and only one team successfully 
recognized this threat. No teams recognized the social engineering attack in mission 
three. Further investigation revealed that network traffic does not always display in real-
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time due to packet loss. When lost packets are picked up by cyber-analysis tools, the 
information is displayed at a later time. This typically took more than 30 minutes to 
display in our environment and ultimately meant that information regarding these threats 
never reached the participants within the allotted 30 minute mission time. With that in 
mind, packet loss is a normal characteristic of network performance. Future designs 
should consider this reality. 
 Across teams, the ability to recognize and resolve the threats in this experiment 
were very similar. The most decisive factor in the performance differences between high 
and low teams was the time it took the team to report on their missions. The results 
showed that high and low teams differed in their performance, but did not provide 
indications of the mechanisms behind the differences. Future designs may want to 
compare novice with expert teams, and reevaluate performance scoring to develop a more 
sensitive method. 
Although the difficulty was designed to increase through missions two and three, 
normal packet loss eliminated the team’s ability to identify and report on these attacks. 
This raises questions about the difficulty of the missions, however only missions one and 
four (the denial of service attack) can be considered here. Thus, there is not a strong 
indication that the missions themselves actually were more difficult. This, along with the 
small sample size, may also be why the workload data from the Workload TLX survey 
did not provide expected results. Future designs may want to consider this when 
manipulating difficulty across missions. 
Both good and bad teams came to a consensus on their mission reports and used 
all the tools provided to them with the exception of nMap. Interestingly, no teams used 
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this tool. When asked about the decision to use Wireshark, participants stated there are 
many similarities between nMap and Wireshark and that they felt more comfortable with 
Wireshark. Future research should seek to understand why cyber-analysts prefer to use 
some tools and not others, along with heuristic evaluations of tools’ user interfaces and 
comparisons of tools in experimental conditions. 
On occasion, complications arose when accessing the virtual environment hosted 
by DETER Lab due to its resource sharing nature. Students, designers, and experimenters 
from around the world all share the resources offered by DETER Lab to host virtual 
networks for various purposes. Scheduled experiments discussed in this paper had to be 
cancelled when DETER was faced with a “tragedy of the commons” economic problem 
and resources were unavailable. Future designs may want to consider hosting virtual 
networks with cloud services that can guarantee environments are available when 
experimentation is ready to begin. 
Evidenced by this experiment’s small sample size, volunteers were difficult to 
find. This was likely due to the experiment seeking skilled individuals at a graduate 
student and professional level. Reimbursement offered to participants should better match 
their valuable time. Additionally, distributed-team experimental designs may make it 
possible to recruit from a much larger population. A virtual network that is hosted by 
cloud services can support globally distributed teams. Such a design ultimately allows for 
a host of new research questions, as well as requires effective methods that facilitate team 
communication (e.g. phone, messengers, email, etc.) when team members are not all in 
direct proximity with one another. Distributed designs will need to incorporate such 
communication methods, and research may want to examine the differences between 
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communication methods as well as distributed and non-distributed cyber-teams. Finally, 
incorporating DEXTAR into cybersecurity education may help prepare students for 
cybersecurity careers after graduation. In turn, this may help continuing research, 
including the evaluation of DEXTAR as a training platform. 
Table 3 
 
 
Summary of Lessons Learned  
Lesson Learned Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Packet loss 
 
 
Mission time should be extended to allow 
network monitoring tools to pick up and 
display lost packets. 
 
Time was the only component of the 
performance measure that resulted in 
significance 
 
More sensitive team performance 
measures should be developed in the 
cybersecurity context. Scores may 
increase due to correct threat 
identification, correct resolution, and 
quality reporting. Scores may decrease 
due to incorrect threat identification, 
incorrect resolution, and reporting false 
alarms. 
 
No indication of participant skill level 
 
Keyword pairwise comparisons of expert 
mental models may help identify 
participant skill level. 
 
No indication that missions increased in 
difficulty 
 
Increase mission time to account for 
packet loss. 
No teams used nMap 
 
Evaluate tool interfaces and compare tools 
in experimental conditions. 
 
Unable to access virtual environment due 
to unavailable resources 
 
Virtual networks should be hosted with 
cloud services that can guarantee 
resources are available. 
 
Small sample size 
 
Reimbursement should match participants 
who qualify to volunteer for high-fidelity 
research. Distributed experimental designs 
also reach a larger population. 
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CONCLUSION 
 This thesis covered the examination of cybersecurity analysts within DEXTAR, a 
high-fidelity cybersecurity testbed. Although mission performance scores accounted for 
threats recognized, threats resolved, situation awareness, and total time spent on a 
mission, total time spent was ultimately the deciding factor in this experiment revealing 
that more sensitive performance measures may need to be developed. The DEXTAR 
testbed displayed evidence that it is capable of high-fidelity cybersecurity 
experimentation. Limitations were revealed that may aid in better high-fidelity 
cybersecurity testbed design, and further discussion made additional suggestions for 
future cybersecurity research. 
  
 
 
26 
 
REFERENCES 
Ashkanasy, N. M. (2004). Emotion and performance. Human Performance, 17(2), 137-
144. 
Bartlett, C. E., & Cooke, N. J. (2015, September). Human-Robot Teaming in Urban 
Search and Rescue. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society Annual Meeting (Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 250-254). SAGE Publications. 
Benzel, T. (2011, December). The science of cyber security experimentation: the DETER 
project. In Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications 
Conference (pp. 137-148). ACM. 
Cain, A. A., & Schuster, D. (2014, March). Measurement of situation awareness among 
diverse agents in cyber security. In 2014 IEEE International Inter-Disciplinary 
Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support 
(CogSIMA) (pp. 124-129). IEEE. 
Cannon‐Bowers, J. A., & Salas, E. (2001). Reflections on shared cognition. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, 22(2), 195-202. 
Champion, M., Jariwala, S., Ward, P., & Cooke, N. J. (2014, September). Using 
Cognitive Task Analysis to Investigate the Contribution of Informal Education to 
Developing Cybersecurity Expertise. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 310-314). SAGE 
Publications. 
Champion, M., Rajivan, P., Cooke, N. J., & Jariwala, S. (2012, March). Team-based 
cyber defense analysis. In Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and 
Decision Support (CogSIMA), 2012 IEEE International Multi-Disciplinary 
Conference on (pp. 218-221). IEEE. 
Converse, S. (1993). Shared mental models in expert team decision making. Individual 
and group decision making: Current, (1993), 221. 
 
Cooke, N., Gorman, J. C., & Kiekel, P. A. (2008). Communication as team-level 
cognitive processing. In Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
Cooke, N. J., Gorman, J. C., Myers, C. W., & Duran, J. L. (2013). Interactive team 
cognition. Cognitive science, 37(2), 255-285. 
Cooke, N. J., Gorman, J. C., Winner, J. L., & Durso, F. T. (2007). Team 
cognition. Handbook of applied cognition, 2, 239-268. 
Crawford, M. (April 21, 2006). Whoops, human error does it again. CSO Online. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.cso.com.au/article/155941/whoops_human_error_does_it_again/ 
 
 
27 
 
D’Amico, A., Whitley, K., Tesone, D., OBrien, B., & Roth, E. (2005). Achieving cyber 
defense situational awareness: A cognitive task analysis of information assurance 
analysts. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting Proceedings, 
49(3) 229-233. 
Demir, M., McNeese, N. J., & Cooke, N. J. (2016, March). Team communication 
behaviors of the human-automation teaming. In 2016 IEEE International Multi-
Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and 
Decision Support (CogSIMA) (pp. 28-34). IEEE. 
Folkman, S., & Moskowitz, J. T. (2000). Stress, positive emotion, and coping. Current 
directions in psychological science, 9(4), 115-118. 
Fouse, S., Cooke, N. J., Gorman, J. C., Murray, I., Uribe, M., & Bradbury, A. (2011, 
September). Effects of role and location switching on team performance in a 
collaborative planning environment. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 1442-1446). SAGE 
Publications. 
Gutzwiller, R. S., Fugate, S., Sawyer, B. D., & Hancock, P. A. (2015, September). The 
human factors of cyber network defense. In Proceedings of the Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 322-326). SAGE 
Publications. 
Hart, S. G., & Staveland, L. E. (1988). Development of NASA-TLX (Task Load Index): 
Results of empirical and theoretical research. Advances in psychology, 52, 139-
183. 
Im, G. P., & Baskerville, R. L. (2005). A longitudinal study of information system threat 
categories: the enduring problem of human error. ACM SIGMIS Database, 36(4), 
68-79. 
Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Perrig, W. J., & Meier, B. (2010). The concurrent validity 
of the N-back task as a working memory measure.Memory, 18(4), 394-412. 
Jorna, P. G. (1992). Spectral analysis of heart rate and psychological state: A review of 
its validity as a workload index. Biological psychology, 34(2), 237-257. 
Klimoski, R., & Mohammed, S. (1994). Team mental model: Construct or 
metaphor?. Journal of management, 20(2), 403-437. 
Knott, B. A., Mancuso, V. F., Bennett, K., Finomore, V., McNeese, M., McKneely, J. A., 
& Beecher, M. (2013, September). Human Factors in Cyber Warfare Alternative 
Perspectives. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
Annual Meeting (Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 399-403). SAGE Publications. 
 
 
28 
 
Liu, P., Erbacher, R., Glodek, W., Etoty, R. E., & Yen, J. (2013). Human Subject 
Research Protocol: Computer-Aided Human Centric Cyber Situation Awareness: 
Understanding Cognitive Processes of Cyber Analysts (No. ARL-TR-6731). 
ARMY RESEARCH LAB ADELPHI MD COMPUTATIONAL AND 
INFORMATION SCIENCES DIRECTORATE. 
Paris, C. R., Salas, E., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A. (2000). Teamwork in multi-person 
systems: a review and analysis. Ergonomics, 43(8), 1052-1075. 
Rajivan, P. (2014). Information Pooling Bias in Collaborative Cyber Forensics (Doctoral 
dissertation, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY). 
Rajivan, P., Champion, M., Cooke, N. J., Jariwala, S., Dube, G., & Buchanan, V. (2013, 
July). Effects of teamwork versus group work on signal detection in cyber defense 
teams. In International Conference on Augmented Cognition (pp. 172-180). 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Rajivan, P., Janssen, M. A., & Cooke, N. J. (2013, September). Agent-based model of a 
cyber security defense analyst team. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 314-318). SAGE 
Publications. 
Richardson, R. (2008). CSI computer crime and security survey. Computer Security 
Institute, 1, 1-30. 
Salas, E., Dickinson, T. L., Converse, S. A., & Tannenbaum, S. I. (1992). Toward an 
understanding of team performance and training. Teams their Training and 
Performance, 3-29. 
Saucier, G. (1994). Mini-markers: A brief version of Goldberg's unipolar Big-Five 
markers. Journal of personality assessment, 63(3), 506-516.  
 
 
29 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
RECRUITING MATERIAL 
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Paid Research Opportunity 
We are looking for individuals experienced in hacking, network forensics, and I/T 
administration to participate in a cyber security exercise. 
 
Participants will be compensated $10 per hour, and the experiment is expected to 
last 4 hours. Participation is limited to one session. Sessions are available Monday 
through Saturday starting 11/16/2015 and will be added as needed through 
December, 2015. Parking and temporary parking passes are provided upon arrival. 
Participants must have normal to corrected hearing and vision, and must be fluent in 
the English language. 
Signup online now at cyberstudy.hfesasu.org! Try not to sign up with people you 
know well. 
This study is being conducted at Arizona State University's Polytechnic campus by 
researchers in the Human Systems Engineering program’s CERTT Lab. Contact us 
with any questions at asucyber2015@gmail.com. 
Location: Interdisciplinary Science and Technology Bldg III, 7417 Innovation Way S 
#161, Mesa, AZ 85212 
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RECRUITING SCRIPT 
 
A team of researchers at ASU Poly would like to invite your participation in a cyber 
security exercise at the Poly campus.  Morning and afternoon sessions are available.  You 
will be compensated $10 an hour, for approximately 4 hours to be trained in the cyber 
simulator and to engage in cyber forensics exercises as part of a three-person team 
You can participate in this study if you are: 
 At least 18 years old 
 Fluent in the English language 
 Comfortable participating in team activities 
 Have average or corrected to average hearing and vision 
Please sign the sheet being passed around the room and provide your contact information 
so that we can get in touch with you and schedule a session. 
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APPENDIX B 
INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENT 
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“Hello analysts. GEO, the company you work for, has decided to implement a new cyber-
defense department and you three were the top candidates selected to be part of this team. 
The company has provided you with Wireshark and nMap as tools to monitor network 
traffic and packet data. All three of you have full administrator access to the network and 
will be able to make changes in order to defend against attack. GEO has seen an increase 
in cyberattacks recently and believes you three, working as a team, will provide much 
needed support. Because this is a new team, GEO would like four reports compiled, one 
every thirty minutes, regarding any suspicious activity you detect and the actions you 
took to resolve them. While you all have equal access to the whole network, GEO has 
also assigned roles to each of you. Here, [station 4] your primary responsibilities include 
the Web Server and compiling the team report. Here, [station 5] your primary 
responsibilities include workstations in Administration and the Admin Data Server. 
Finally, [station 6] your primary responsibilities include workstations in the company’s 
Sales Department and the Sales Data Server. Remember, you are working as a team and 
can share any information however needed. A network topology has been provided to aid 
as a map of GEO’s network. The names of machines on the network are server1 – spelled 
all lowercase with the numerical number 1 and no spaces – through server4, admin1 
through 10, and sales1 through 10. This may be informative to you for navigation 
purposes and is located on the topology handout. The webserver is also accessible via 
your web-browser by typing server1 in the address bar, and has already been added as 
your browser’s default page.” 
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APPENDIX C 
 
VIRTUAL NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
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APPENDIX D 
NASA TLX SURVEY 
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TLX Report  
Instructions: 
Below you will be asked some questions about the task you just completed. Please read 
each question and think about the information being requested. Then, respond on each 
scale about how you felt or what you experienced within the task. Please consider each 
scale independent of the previous or following scales. If you have any questions, please 
ask the experimenter. 
 
1. How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g., thinking, deciding, 
calculating, remembering, looking, searching, etc.)?  
          
The task was easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 The task was demanding 
 
The task was simple 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 The task was complex 
 
The task was forgiving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 The task was exacting 
 
The task was mentally 
effortless 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 The task was mentally 
difficult 
 
 
2. How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the tasks or 
task elements occurred? 
 
The task was slow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 The task was rapid 
 
The task was leisurely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 The task was frantic 
 
 
3. How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of the task set 
by the experimenter (or yourself)? 
 
Unsuccessful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Successful 
 
 
4. Please rate the following emotional dimensions felt during the task 
 
Insecure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Secure 
 
Discouraged 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Gratified 
 
Irritated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Content 
 
Stressed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Relaxed 
 
Annoyed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Complacent 
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How Accurately Can You Describe Yourself? 
 
Please use this list of common human traits to describe yourself as accurately as possible. 
Describe yourself as you see yourself at the present time, not as you wish to be in the 
future. 
Describe yourself as you are generally or typically, as compared with other persons you 
know of the same sex and of roughly your same age. Before each trait, please write a 
number indicating how accurately that trait describes you, using the following rating 
scale: 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Extremely 
Inaccurate 
Very 
Inaccurate 
Moderately 
Inaccurate 
Slightly 
Inaccurate 
Neither 
Accurate 
nor 
Inaccurate 
Slightly 
Accurate 
Moderately 
Accurate 
Very 
Accurate 
Extremely 
Accurate 
 
____ Bashful ____ Energetic ____ Moody ____ Systematic 
____ Bold ____ Envious ____ Organized ____ Talkative 
____ Careless ____ Extraverted ____ Philosophical ____ Temperamental 
____ Cold ____ Fretful ____ Practical ____ Touchy 
____ Complex ____ Harsh ____ Quiet ____ Uncreative 
____ Cooperative ____ Imaginative ____ Relaxed ____ Unenvious 
____ Creative ____ Inefficient ____ Rude ____ Unintellectual 
____ Deep ____ Intellectual ____ Shy ____ Unsympathetic 
____ Disorganized ____ Jealous ____ Sloppy ____ Warm 
____ Efficient ____ Kind ____ Sympathetic ____ Withdrawn 
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APPENDIX F 
DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE 
  
 
 
 
 
Date: ________ Team #: ________ Role/Station: ________
 
Please answer the following to the best of your ability. All answers will be kept 
confidential and will only be reported statistically (grouped with others’ responses). 
Please feel free to leave a question blank if you feel uncomfortable answering it. 
 
1. What is your age? _________
 
2. What is your gender? (circle): 
a. Male 
b. Female 
 
3. Please specify your ethnicity. 
a. White 
b. Hispanic or Latino 
c. Black or African American 
d. Native American or 
    American Indian 
e. Asian/Pacific Islander 
f. Other 
g. Prefer not to answer 
 
4. What is your current level of 
    education? 
a. Less than High School 
b. High School/GED 
c. Some College 
d. 2 year degree 
e. 4 year degree 
f. Master’s 
g. Doctoral 
h. Professional (MD, JD, etc.) 
 
5. If you have been or are enrolled in 
    a post high school institution, what 
    is your major? 
    _______________________ 
 
6. Are you currently employed? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
7. If yes to #5, what is your job title? 
    _______________________ 
 
8. Do you have experience planning 
    or coordinating events? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
9. If yes to #10, please elaborate: 
_______________________________ 
_______________________________ 
_______________________________ 
_______________________________ 
 
10. How often do you use a computer? 
a. Daily 
b. Every couple days 
c. Once a week 
d. Every couple weeks 
e. Less than once a month 
f. I do not use computers 
 
11. Please rate the degree to which you 
      agree with the following statement: 
      I am proficient with computers. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
12. In what way do you use 
      computers? (Circle all that apply) 
a. I do not use computers 
b. Internet 
c. Email 
d. Word processing 
e. Spreadsheets 
f. Computer Games 
g. Other 
 
13. Do you have any experience in 
      cyber security? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
14. If yes to #15, please describe: 
_____________________________ 
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_____________________________ 
_____________________________ 
15. Do you work with a team on a 
      regular basis? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
16. If yes to #17, in what context do 
      you work with a team and how 
      many individuals make up this 
      team? (Circle all that apply) 
a. Work-related If circled, 
    provide number of 
    individuals _________ 
b. Sports If circled, provide 
    number of individuals 
    _________ 
c. Other Recreation If circled, 
    provide number of 
    individuals _________ 
d. Other If circled, provide 
    number of individuals 
    _________ 
Please specify other: 
_____________________ 
 
Please rate the degree to which you agree 
with the following statements. Consider 
your team to be made up of the other people 
on your side of the divider. 
 
17. I feel like my individual 
      contribution to the team was 
      important. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
18. Regardless of outcome, I feel like 
      we performed well overall. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
19. The other people on my team were 
      good members. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
20. If I were asked to participate in 
      another project like this one, I 
      would like to be with the same 
      team member. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
21. This task was complicated. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
22. The strategy we employed were the 
      most effective way to complete the 
      task. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
23. This task was boring. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
24. The way we made decisions was 
      the best way to make decisions. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
25. Our group could have done better 
      if we had worked more as a team. 
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a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
26. I did not like the way our team 
      made decisions. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
27. I was motivated to help the group 
      complete missions. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
28. This task was easy. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
29. I liked to talk with other members 
      of the group. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
30. The user-computer interface was 
      easy to use. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
 
31. I enjoyed participating in this 
      study. 
a. Strongly Agree 
b. Slightly Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Slightly Disagree 
e. Strongly Disagree 
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APPENDIX G 
 
TEAM PROCESS CHECKLIST 
  
 
 
 
 
Date:  Team: # Mission: # Experimenter
Rate all dimensions from 0 (poor/never) to 10 (excellent/always). 
1. Coordination: The timely and adaptive push and pull of info among team members 
(e.g. getting the right information to the team at the right time).
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Comments: 
 
2. Communication: The verbal or non-verbal passing of relevant and necessary 
information and the recipient’s acknowledgement of understanding that information. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Comments: 
 
3. Team Situation Awareness: Team members perceive current environmental 
conditions, communicating perceptions of those conditions appropriately, and 
coordinating responses as necessary. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Comments: 
 
4. Team Problem Solving: Team identifies problems and generates possible solutions. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Comments: 
 
5. Team Decision Making: Occurs when all team members agree on one or a set of 
solutions over alternatives. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Comments: 
 
6. Outcome and Revision: Teams analyze, test, and validate the agreed upon team 
solution against goal requirements. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Comments: 
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7. Overall Team Process: How good was the team process overall (taking all 6 process 
measures into account)?
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Comments: 
 
8. Team members take turns speaking: Not talking over each other, taking turns 
speaking, and/or waiting for a response and then answering. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Comments: 
 
9. Off topic conversations: Anything that is unrelated to the mission. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Comments: 
 
10. Team plan discussion: Any planning, correcting/editing, proposing an idea/plan of 
action? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Comments: 
 
11. Team verified and agreed on report: Acknowledgement of ALL team members and 
acceptance by ALL team members. 
Yes No 
Comments: 
 
12. Team members use provided tools: Any tools (e.g. software) given to the participants 
to aid in the mission. 
Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3 None 
Comments: 
 
13. General Comments:  
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APPENDIX H 
CONSENT FORM  
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CONSENT FORM 
CYBER WARFARE SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT AND ADAPTER PHASE II 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purposes of this form is to provide you (as a prospective research study participant) 
information that may affect your decision as to whether or not to participate in this 
research and to record the consent of those who agree to be involved in the study. 
 
RESEARCHERS 
Nancy J. Cooke, Professor, Aaron Bradbury, Graduate Researcher, and Mike Becker, 
Graduate Researcher have invited your participation in a research study. 
 
STUDY PURPOSE 
The purpose of the research is to better understand the team process and performance 
of computer security defense analysts and how various measures of individual and team 
state relate to team effectiveness. The testbed you will work in is used to test 
hypothesized needs, cognitive processes, and displays for enhanced situation 
awareness for cyber security analysis. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH STUDY 
If you decide to participate, you will join a study funded by the Army Research 
Organization through Sandia Research Corporation and the Air Force Research 
Laboratory through Charles River Analytics. You will participate in a simulated computer 
security task as part of a 3-person team. After signing the informed consent, you will be 
presented with materials that instruct you on the simulated task. After reaching a certain 
performance level through training, you will then interact (communicate) with other 
trained participants as a team to make decisions related to the computer security task. 
Measures of your team’s task performance will be collected at the end of the task. 
Experimenters will also observe and evaluate the team’s process behaviors such as 
communication, coordination, and leadership. Communications and team process 
behaviors will be measured through observations and audio and video recording. A 
personality scale will also be administered at the end of the study. In addition you will be 
asked to wear a sensor on your head and on either your arm or your calf. The head-
worn sensor measures motion and oxygenated blood flow to the prefrontal cortex (the 
part of the brain behind the forehead). It is worn as a headband. The arm/calf-worn 
sensor measures galvanic skin response (the production of sweat on the skin), 
temperature, motion, cardiac information, and oxygenated blood flow. It is worn similarly 
to an mp3 player during exercise. We will use an alcohol prep pad to clean the surface 
of your skin to ensure that no lotion or makeup will interfere with data acquisition; 
however neither sensor requires adhesion to the skin surface. Neither sensor should 
interfere with experimental activities. In addition mouse activity will be recorded. 
 
We anticipate that this study will require roughly 4 hours. Your participation is completely 
voluntary and you may cease participation at any time. There will be approximately 30-
60 other teams in this study. Participants must be between 18 and 50 years of age. 
 
RISKS 
Pulse oximetry sensors such as those included in this study have been deemed safe by 
the FDA. People have sometimes reported the following side effects, however these side 
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effects are relatively uncommon, and usually resolve quickly afterwards when they 
occur: 
 
 Itchiness 
 Tingling 
 Skin irritation and redness under the electrode 
 Transient (brief) headaches 
 
We will periodically ask you about these side effects during the study. If you notice any 
side effects during your session or after you leave the laboratory, please contact the 
study doctor or the research staff to let them know. Your privacy will be protected in this 
study (see section on confidentiality). 
 
BENEFITS 
You will personally benefit by increasing your experience with research methodology in 
human systems engineering and others will benefit more generally from the findings 
pertinent to and the tools developed for enhancing situation awareness in cyber security. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential. The results of this research 
study may be used in reports, presentations, and publications, but the researchers will 
not identify you. The Department of Defense is supporting this research. They and our 
research partners at Charles River Analytics and will have access to research data. 
Federal government offices that oversee human research protection will have access to 
research records and identifiable subject records to ensure compliance. In order to 
maintain confidentiality of your records, Dr. Nancy J. Cooke will follow these procedures: 
(1) each participant will be assigned a number; (2) the researchers will record any data 
collected during the study by number, not by name; (3) any original data files will be 
stored in a secured location accessed only by authorized researchers; (4) consent forms 
will not link names to ID numbers; (5) video recordings will be kept apart from other 
study data; (6) only processed data from video recordings will be used for further 
analysis (no images). Consent forms will also be secured in a separate file. 
 
WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. It is ok for you to say no. Even if you 
say yes now, you are free to say no later, and withdraw from the study at any time. Your 
participation is voluntary and that nonparticipation or withdrawal is acceptable. 
 
COSTS AND PAYMENTS 
The researchers want your decision about participating in the study to be absolutely 
voluntary, yet they recognize that your participation may pose inconvenience. You will be 
compensated $10 per hour for your participation. Additionally, please ask us any 
research questions at the end as we hope this is a positive learning experience for you. 
 
DISCOSURE 
Experimenter Nancy J. Cooke is related through marriage to Steve Shope of Sandia 
Research Corporation, President of the prime company subcontracting to ASU. 
 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
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Any questions you have concerning the research study or your participation in the study, 
before or after your consent, will be answered by Nancy J. Cooke at ASU Polytechnic, 
480-988-2173. 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you 
feel you have been placed at risk; you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects 
Institutional  
 
Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at 480-965 
6788. 
This form explains the nature, demands, benefits and any risk of the project. By signing 
this form you agree knowingly to assume any risks involved. Remember, your 
participation is voluntary. You may choose not to participate or to withdraw your consent 
and discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefit. In signing this 
consent form, you are not waiving any legal claims, rights, or remedies. A copy of this 
consent form will be given (offered) to you. 
 
Your signature below indicates that you consent to participate in the above study. 
 
_______________________  _______________________  ____________ 
Subject's Signature   Printed Name    Date 
 
 
INVESTIGATOR’S STATEMENT 
"I certify that I have explained to the above individual the nature and purpose, the 
potential benefits and possible risks associated with participation in this research study, 
have answered any questions that have been raised, and have witnessed the above 
signature. These elements of Informed Consent conform to the Assurance given by 
Arizona State University to the Office for Human Research Protections to protect the 
rights of human subjects. I have provided (offered) the subject/participant a copy of this 
signed consent document." 
 
 
Signature of Investigator___________________________________ Date____________ 
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APPENDIX I 
 
PAYMENT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
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Cyber Awareness II Project Participant Acknowledgement of Payment 
 
I, _______________________________________________, participated in a 
collaborative team study that was conducted in Dr. Nancy Cooke’s Cognitive 
Engineering Research Institute (CERI) Laboratory located at Arizona State University’s 
Polytechnic Campus. 
 
I was paid [$10/hr] a total of $________ 
 
(Circle one of the following that applies) 
For completing that study session for which I was scheduled. 
 OR 
For completing part of the study session for which I was scheduled. 
 OR 
Because other participants did not show up and I was sent home. 
 OR 
I was the fourth person, therefore was rescheduled for a guaranteed spot in a different 
study session and was sent home.  
 
Print Name: ___________________________________ 
 
Sign Name: ___________________________________ 
 
Phone Number: ________________________________ 
 
 
 
Date: __________ Participant Number: ___________ Experimenter Initials: __________ 
 
